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BLUMBERG

- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -

v. M. & T.

[So F. No. 17945.

INCORPORATED

In Bank.

[34 C.2d

Aug. 31. 1949.] .

BENJAMIN BLUMBERG et a1., Appellants, V. M. & T.
INCORPORATED (a Corporation) et a1., Respondents.
[1] Dismissal-Upon Failure of Proof-When Motion Granted.A nonsuit may be granted only when, (iisregarding conflicting
evidence and giving plaintiff's evidenc~ all the value to which
it is legally entitled, indulging in every '.!gitimate inference
which may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict for plaintiff.
[2] Negligence-Invit~ee-Duties Toward.-Persons invited by an
o!:ice building tenant to see his office are business visitors,
and as to them the property owner is obliged to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably 'lafe condition,
or to warn them of danger. The duty is not limited to conditions actually known by the owner to be dangerous, but
extends also to conditions which might have been found
dangerous by the exercise of reasonable care.
[3) Id.-Nonsuit.-In an action against the o,vner of an office
building for personal injuries sustained by a tenant's invitee in the lobby of the building when she fell on a floor
mat, it was improper to grant a nonsuit where the evidence
showed that the mat had o,;>enings of sufficient size to allow
a heel of a shoe, such 'as that worn by plaintiff and a large
number of women, to slip into one of such openings, and the
j ..ry reasonably could have in~erred from the evidence that
her heel became wedged in the mat in precispiy that manner,
and where it was also a question of fact for the jury whether
the nature of the mat was obvious to plaintiff.
[4] Id.-Oare by Owners of Real Propert;i-Buildings.-The fa.lt
that a floor mat in the lobby of an office building is wide,Iy
used is no legal excuse for the owner's maintenance of a
dangerous condition in the mat.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of thp
City and County of San Francisco. Pat R.Parker, Judge.·
Reversed.
(2) Se\! 19 Oal.Jur. 618; 38 Am.Jur. 754.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § ~5; [2j Negligence,
§73; [31 Negligence. §l77: [41 Np'!ligPD('e. §60.
• Assigned by Chainnao df J uuicial Council.
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Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of nonsuit. reversed.
Ernest I. Spiegl for Appellants.
Cooley, Crowley, Gaither & Dana. Cooley, Crowley" Gaither
and Louis V. Crowley for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J .-Benjamin and Charlotte Blumberg sued
to recover damages for personal injuries which she assertedly
SUBtained when she . fell in the lobby of a downtown office
building in San Francisco. Their appeal from an adverse
judgment challenges the ruling of the trial court granting
the property owner's motion for a nonsuit.
According to the settled stIltement, about two bours
after a dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Isaacs, the Blumbergs accompanied .their friends to see Mr. Isaacs' office. The
accident occurred after they returned to the ground ft.oor.
Mrs. Blumberg testified in part: ". . .1 remember taking
a few steps and then all of a sudden . • . there was a feeling as though .something beld me down and right with that
simultaneously my bead was hitting this terruzo ft.oor and
someone called out. It was all in one, this blow bere; I just
remember going down and cracking my bead." When asked
whether there was "any sensation as if your foot bad slipped'"
she replied: HOb, no." She gave the same answer to the
question: "Was there any sensation of your ankle having
turned'" In further explanation of ber injuries, she said
that she fell on a large mat in front of the elevat.ors while
walking with bead erect, watcbing ber way. AB described by
her, she fell toward the lobby door,with ht'r bead striking
the bare ft.oor and ber legs on the mat. After the accident,
bel' right stocking bore the imprint of the mat.
Mrs. Isaacs testified that, after the two couples' descended
in the elevator, the men preCt'ded their wives across the lobby.
'Mrs. Blumberg followed them. Mrs. Isaacs. walking slightly
. behind the three, saw Mrs. Blumberg fall .... absollltply
straight as though she bad bad som('thing hold hE'r 01' pull
her ... She fell in one straight l':-.np . . . bel' knpE'S didn't
go down ft.rst, her arms didn't go down first. . . ." M1'R. IRaacs
added that, immediately prior to thE' aI'I'M"nt. Ml'R. Rlumberg's mannel' of walking WaR nOl'mal. She was not running,
and the witness did not see ber slip•
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The record shows that the mat mentioned in the nidenee.
was constructed of small pieces or strips of rubber or similar;
material held together in a row, running in both directionS'
at right angles, with open spaces of varying sizes up to, but
not greater than, 1-1/16th of an inch by 5/8ths of an inch. A
witness familiar with the shoe business testified that the left
shoe worn by Mrs. Blumberg on the night of the accident
was made with a medium spike heel of the type worn on the
.treet by about 60 per cent of the women in San Francisco.
The usual measurement across the base of heels of this type,
he added, is from 11 to 12/16ths of an inch. However, Mrs..
Blumberg's heel had been shortened on a trimmer and
measured 14:/16ths of an inch across the front of the base and
13/16ths of an inch from front to rear. Upon cross enmination, he declared that a small cap at the base of the heel had
been put on by a repair shop; that the shoe was a regular
street shoe rather than an evening shoe; and that there is no
such thing as a standard heel.
.As justifying a reversal of the judgment on the ground
that this evidence would support a verdict and judgment in
their favor, the Blumbergs contend that the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that Mrs. Blumberg'. left heel
became Wedged in one of the interstices in the mal Their
theory is that, although ber heel was too large to enter any
one of the spaces squarely, it must have entered and become
wedged in one of the 1-1/16th of an inch by 5/Sths of an inch
spaces when brought down at an angle with toe raised, in the '
manner common to women walking in high-heeled shoes. The
evidence also indicates, they argue, that the accident could
not have happened in any other manner, since she did not
slip, trip or turn her ankle, and there was no foreign matter
on the mat. As the basis of liability, it is said that the size
of the openings was inherently dangerous for the San Fran- :
cisco women who wear such heels for street use, and the property owner knew, or should have known, of such danger.
Finally, it is said, the Blumbergs were invitees, and the property owner owed a duty to maintain the lobby in a life condition or to give warning of any danger.
.As justifying the ruling on the motion, the respondent
takes the position that the evidence offered by the Blumbergs
is insufficient to support a verdict for them because (1) it
does not show that the mat was defective; nor (2) that it
was dangerously constructed, or different from mats generally used in office building lobbies; nor (3) that the property
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owner knew the relation between the sizes of the heel of a
woman's shoe and the openings in the mat; nor (4) that the
owner knew, or had any reason to believe, that there was
danger in maintaining the mat; nor (5) that Mrs. Blumberg's heel actually caught in an opening in the mat. Finally,
they insist, if the mat was dangerous, its nature was obvious
to Mrs. Blumberg, who was therefore warned of its condition.
[1] A trial court is justified in granting a motion for nonsuit ". . . when, and only when, disregarding con1licting
evidence, and giving to plainti1f's evidence all the value to
which it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate
inference which may be drawn from that evidenc.>.e, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient
substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."
(Card v. BomB, 210 Cal. 200, 202 [291 P. 190]; see, also,
Hale v. Depaoli, 88 Ca1.2d 228, 229 [201 P.2d 1]; Neel v.
Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647, 650 [122 P.2d 576] ; Estate 01
Lances, 216 Cal. 897,401 [14 P.2d 768].) As stated in Estate
of Lances, supra, page 400, "Unless it can be said as a matter
of law, that ... no other reasonable conclusion is legally
deducible from the evidence, and that any other holding would
be 80 lacking in evidentiary support that a reviewing court
would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal, or the trial
court to set it aside as a matter of law, the trial court is not
justified in taking the case from the jury."
[2] As invitees of Mr. and Mrs. Isaacs, tenants of the
building, the Blumbergs were business visitors and as to them
the property owner was obliged to exercise ordinary care to
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn
them of danger. The duty was not limited to conditions actually known by the owner to be dangerous, but extended also
to conditions which might have been found dangerous by the
exercise of reasonable care. (Mondine v. Sarlin, 11 Cal.2d
593, 597 [81 P.2d 903] ; Dobbie v. Pacific Gas ct Electric Co.,
95 Cal.App. 781, 790 [278 P. 630].)
[8] The uncontradicted testimony clearly shows that the
floor mat upon which Mrs. Blumberg fell had openings of
sufficient size to allow a portion of the heel of her shoe to
slip into one of them, at least at an angle. There is also evidence that the shoes of a large number of the women in San
Francisco have heels of the size worn by her. Accordingly,
the jury reasonably could have inferred that her left heel
became wedged in the mat in precisely that manner, causing
her to fall.
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Reasonable inquiry and inspection would have informe
.the property owner that it was maintaining in the lobb'
a mat with openings likely to retain and hold the heel
of a shoe such as is customarily worn by a large number 0
the women in San Francisco. Moreover, whether the nature
of the mat was obvious to Mrs. Blumberg was a question
of fact for the determination of the jury. [41 The claim that
the mat in question was widely used is no legal excuse for
the maintenance of a dangerous condition. The fact that
a negligent practice is general does not transform it into
reasonable care.
.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Spence, J.t concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
A possessor of land is not an insurer of the. safety of his
business guests, nor is he liable for harm resulting from a
condition from which no unreasonable risk was to be antieipated. He "is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon
if, but only if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could
discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should
realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them (HifUls v.
Wheadon, 19 Cal.2d 458, 460 [121 P.2d 724]; Beese v. Smith,
9 Ca1.2d 324,328 [70 P.2d 933]; CkapmaflV. Title lmurance
ct Trust Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 745, 751 [158 P.2d 42] ; Jrmes v.
Bridges, 38 Cal.App.2d 341, 345 [101 P.2d 91]), and
(b) has DO reason to believe that they will discover the
condition or realize the risk involved therein (Blodgett v.
B. H. DyaB Co., 4 Cal.2d 511, 512-513 [50 P.2d 801] ; Shanley
v. American OUfl6 Co., 185 Cal. 552, 555 [197 P. 793]; Boyal
lmurance Co. v. Mazzei, 50 Cal.App.2d 549, 552-553 [123 P.2d
586]), and
(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the
land without exercising reasonable care
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid
the harm." (2 Restatement, Torts, § 343, pp. 938-939.) It
was therefore incumbent on plaintiffs to present evidence from
which reasonable men could conclude; (1) that defendanb should have realized that the mat involved an unreaIOnabIe risk to business visitors; and (2) that defendants
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had no reason to believe such visitors would realize the risk
involved therein. In my opinion there was no evidence that
would warrant either of these conclusions.
1. The evidence fails to show that the mat was in any
way different from those in general use. (Yearsley v. American Stores 00.,97 Pa.Super. 275,277.) There was no evidence
that other persons had slipped or fallen on that mat or similar
mats, which might have given defendants reason to believe
that the continued use of the mat would be dangerous. The
majority opinion states that "The fact that a negligent
practice is general does not transform it into reasonable care."
It is equally true, however, that a practice that has been
generally followed without incident is not transformed into
negligence merely by the occurrence of a single accident not
reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiffs rely upon the testimony of
a witness familiar with the shoe business that plaintiff was
wearing the type of heel that 60 per cent of the women of
San Francisco wear for street use. Even if it is assumed
that defendants were aware of this fact, it does not follow
that they should have concluded therefrom that the mat
was unsafe. There is no negligence if harm could not reasonably be foreseen. 'c The standard must be one of conduct,
not of consequences." (Prosser, Torts, § 35, p. 220.) Any
accident raises the question whether it couId reasonably be
foreseen, but one cannot conclude that it eould have been
foreseen merely because it occurred; negligence cannot be
inferred by looking backward "with the wisdom born of the
event." (Cardozo, C. J., in Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay tt cU"
Co., 257 N.Y. 190, 192 [177 N.E. 416] ; Dickson v. Emporium
Mercant'ile Co., Inc., 193 Minn. 629, 631 {259 N.W. 375].}
It is plaintiffs' theory that the heel of Mrs. Blumberg's
.boe became wedged in one of the interstices of defendants'
mat after being inserted at an angle with the toe pointed
upward. They contend that "the accident could not have
happened in any other manner." Diagram B illustrates the
outline of Mrs. Blumberg's shoe with the heel in what plaintiffs term "the situation which must have occurred at the
moment of Mrs. Blumberg's injury." They contend that as
her toe descended and her foot rolled forward, the back of
her heel, describing an are, wedged against the latitudinal
strip of the interstice, causing bE'r to fall. Even if it is
assumed that the accident occurred according to plaintiffs'
theory, can it reasonably be said that it was within the normal
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the sizes of the base of Mrs. Blumberg's heel and the 1&1"PtlII
space in the mat demonstrates the unlikelihood of a
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DIAGRAM A
wedging in the manner alleged. Had plaintiif stepped .",nugB,
down on the mat, it would admittedly have been im:pos$ib,,,,
for her heel to enter the interstice. The accident could
have occurred, by plaintiifs' own admission, because
Blumberg crossed the mat at a right angle to the long
of the interstice and the heel fell well into it. It is
from Diagram B that plaintiif's toe must have been rai:setla
at a relatively high angle and at about the only angle
could prevent the heel from swinging free as plaintiff stelPpe:4~a
forward. The jury might have inferred that these unllSUlll.l
circumstances conspired to cause Mrs. Blumberg to fall.
the duty to anticipate such a possibility, which became alJIPIU:~
ent only by hindsight, cannot be said to be part of the
quirement of ordinary care. (Bar41l v. Beoo.i1lg Iron Co.,
Pa. 274 [51 A. 979]; Austin v. Eastern Mass. St. By.
269 Mass. 420 [169 N.E. 484] ; see, also, Whiting v. City
National City, 9 Cal.2d 163, 165, 166 [69 P.2d 990] ; Dac:u£6,WSJl'"
v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1, 7 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.St.Rep. 56, 33
747].)
2. Even if· reasonable men could diifer as to whether
mat created an unreasonable risk to business visitors,
judgment should be affirmed Any danger inherent in the
mat was as apparent to Mrs. Blumberg as to defendants, and'
a reasonable jury could not conclude that defendants had
reason to believe that she would not realize the risk involved ..
in walking across the mat with the type of heels she was wearing. One ordinarily looks where one is going, and the interstices of the mat were clearly visible. There was nothing
unusual about them in size or design, nothing defective, to
trip the average walker. Actually there was no danger in
the mat lying in wait for Mrs. Blumberg. The danger to be
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anticipated was from the spiked heels, not from the· mat.
Those who walk on spiked heels court danger. That is their
privilege, but it is also their responsibility to consider the
consequences, to be aware of the peculiarities of the shoes
they wear. Mrs. Blumberg not only could see everything that
defendants could by looking at the mat, over which sbe had
walked when she entered the building, but she knew as they
did not the type of heel she was wearing. An" owner is entitled to assume that such invitee will perceive that which
would be obvious to him upon the ordinary use of his own
senses." (Shanley v. American Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552. 555
[197 P. 193] ; Royal Insurance Co. v. Mazzei, 50 CaI.App.2d
549, 552-553 [123 P.2d 586]; see, also, Blodgett v. B. H.
Dyo,s Co., 4: Ca1.2d 511, 512·513 [50 P.2d 801].)
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
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